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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Justice Traynor indicated, a "defect may be variously defined; as
yet no definition has been formulated which will resolve all cases."' 2
Future cases dealing with defective houses will be faced with estab-
lishing criteria for defining a defect. These criteria will probably
vary with different fact situations. The only criterion that can be
relied upon from the opinion in the principal case is that the builder
will not be held to a requirement of perfection. Although it is not
yet certain what will be the basis for strict liability, there can be little
doubt that strict liability will soon permeate realty as well as products
liability.
PRIVATE ACTION FOR TREBLE DAMAGES
UNDER CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7
Plaintiffs, corporate distributors, sought treble damages under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act,1 alleging that defendant's acquisition of a
manufacturer for which plaintiffs were distributors violated section
7 of the Clayton Act2 and that plaintiffs were damaged by defendant's
termination of plaintiffs' distributorship contracts pursuant to the
acquisition. Defendant moved to dismiss, contending that there could
be no action for damages under section 4 based upon a section 7 viola-
tion, as a section 4 recovery is predicated upon an existing illegal mo-
nopoly, which is not prohibited by section 73 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York denied defendant's
42 Traynor, supra note 40, at 367.
138 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964):
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
264 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964):
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
3 The original § 7 made corporate stock acquisitions illegal when the effect would be
to substantially lessen competition "between" the acquired and the acquiring corpora-
tions, or to "create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Despite
the hopes of its designers, the United States Supreme Court quickly rendered it nuga-
tory. This was largely due to Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587(1934) (holding that § 7 applied only to stock, and not to asset, acquisitions), and
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (holding that a charge of sub-
stantial lessening of competition must be based upon a showing that the acquired and
the acquiring corporation substantially competed with one another prior to the merger).
Several unsucessful attempts were made to eliminate these restrictions, e.g., Temporary
National Economic Comm., Final Report and Recommendations, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1941); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 613, 621-27 (1948). The Celler-
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motion and held: A treble damage action may be maintained by the
distributor of a manufacturer who was acquired in violation of section
7 of the Clayton Act. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).1
While the Sherman Act' deals with consummated restraints, the
Clayton Act seeks to reach monopolies in their incipiency,' providing in
section 7 that mergers and acquisitions are illegal when their effect may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act gives private parties injured by any anti-
trust violation the right to treble damages. However, a right to treble
damages for a section 7 violation had been denied in three prior cases,'
and was recognized for the first time in Bostitch.
In finding a right to damages for a section 7 violation, the court in
Bostitch noted that section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that anyone
injured by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
for treble damages. Since the Clayton Act is an antitrust law, "log-
Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), which amended 38 Stat.
730, added asset acquisition to the list of prohibitions, and broadened the standard of
illegality, thereby rendering § 7 more viable. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-46 (1962) ; ATr'Y. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTRMUST REP. 115-17
(1955); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kafauver
Antinerger Act, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1961). For legislative history of the 1950
amendment, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra at 311-23; Bok, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAmv. L. REv. 226, 233-38
(1960). For a complete history of § 7, see generally MARiN, MERGERS AND TE CLAY-
TON AcT (1959).
453 GEO. L.J. 1133; 79 HAv. L. REv. 445. Plaintiffs also alleged a violation of the
Sherman Act § 1. The court found triable issues of fact and denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment on that count. 240 F. Supp. at 528. In addition to damages,
plaintiffs sought a decree of divestiture. Defendant maintained that a private party
may not secure such a decree. The court held that a decree of divestiture is a form of
injunctive relief available to private parties under Clayton Act § 16. 240 F. Supp. at
526.5 Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
0 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
The purpose of the bill was stated by the Senate Judiciary Committee as follows, S.
REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) :
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule,
singly and in themselves, are not covered by the act of July 2, 1890 [the Sherman
Act], or other existing antitrust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal,
to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency
and before consummation.
Congress reiterated this view when § 7 was amended in 1950, S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) :
The committee wish to make it clear that the bill is not intended to revert to the
Sherman Act test. The intent here ... is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a
Sherman Act proceeding.
7 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964),
reversing 221 F. Supp. 15 (E. D. Mo. 1963); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental
Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964) ; Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,
221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), motion for leave to appeal denied, (unreported) (2d
Cir.), ccrt. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
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ically, it follows inevitably that a person injured by reason of anything
forbidden in the Clayton Act may sue for treble damages."' The court
distinguished earlier cases on the ground that those plaintiffs had
demonstrated no present injury, whereas plaintiffs in the principal case
were presently injured by loss of their distributorships. However, the
court did not consider the consequences of extending treble damage
actions to the potential restraints proscribed by section 7, or the effect
upon expanded liability.
The first case to deny the possibility of compensable damages for a
section 7 violation was Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,' in which
minority shareholders of General Motors brought a derivative action
for damages sustained through du Pont's illegal acquisition of General
Motors stock.1" Concluding that "plaintiffs cannot be damaged by a
potential restraint of trade or monopolization,"'1 the court held that no
right to damages accrues from a section 7 violation. Highland Supply
Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,12 in which recovery was sought for in-
jury caused by a competitor's acquisition of a manufacturer, approved
Gottesman in dictum. Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking
Co.,"3 in dismissing an action for damages allegedly sustained through
defendant's acquisition of plaintiff's competitor in violation of Clayton
section 7, provided Gottesman with its most cogent rationale:
Since Clayton § 7 is concerned with the future monopolistic and restrain-
ing tendencies of corporate acquisition, i.e., probable (and hence not
certain) future restraints on commerce, any damages claimed for pros-
pective restraint of trade would be purely speculative, and a plaintiff
cannot recover money damages for anticipated but unimplemented acts
of restraint which may invade its interests.'
In rejecting this line of cases, the court in the principal case relied
solely upon the integrity of its reasoning. This decision was technically
correct-and dispositive of the issue-since, given an actual violation
of section 7, plaintiffs are clearly injured by reason of "something" for-
8 240 F. Supp. at 523.
11221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), notion for leave to appeal denied, (unreported)(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964), 64 CoLUm. L. REv. 597. For a summation
of the legislative history and statutory interpretations pertaining to the right to dam-
ages for a § 7 violation, see 64 CoLum. L. Rav. 597, 598-99 (1964).
:0 The du Pont acquisition was condemned in United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See Dirlam & Stelzer, The Du Pont-General
Motors Decision: in the Antitrust Grain, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 24 (1958) ; Note, YALE
L. J. 1251 (1957) ; 71 HARv. L. Rav. 165 (1957).11221 F. Supp. at 493.
12 327 F2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964), reversing 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
13 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
14 Id. at 717.
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bidden in the antitrust laws. But the "thing forbidden" by section 7 is
a present tendency towards a future-arising substantive evil, and the
reasoning precludes consideration of the difference between the thing
forbidden and the intrinsically potential nature of the thing itself.
In view of the increasingly broad judicial interpretation of antitrust
laws in recent years, this difference may be something of a mirage.
Nevertheless, the central issue in the principal case is sufficiently im-
portant to warrant an articulate development of both the nature of
substantive offenses under section 7, and the relationship of this deci-
sion to other related holdings. Although a "public injury" is no longer
needed to support a claim for damages, 5 and effectuation of the re-
straint (the preparatory stages of which are forbidden by section 7)
may well require considerably more than the individual injury to plain-
tiffs, consideration of the nature and extent of the section 7 violation
seems unavoidable. This is particularly true if the quantitative sub-
stantiality test" is utilized, by which a plaintiff is required to show,
without more, that the acquired firm handled a substantial share 7 of
the relevant market.
It is unfortunate that the court in the principal case failed to
expound on what it would consider sufficient as a substantive violation,
standing alone."i Despite the amenability of the result to strict statu-
tory construction, it is questionable whether the laws were ultimately
intended to invoke section 4 remedies simply by combination of indi-
vidual present injury with a defined violation whose existence is still
assumed to rest upon mere predictive likelihood of future restraint.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the United States Supreme
Court has "not disapproved" of the result in the principal case. In
15 This is at least true with reference to the Sherman Act. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), 73 HARV. L. REv. 200 (1959), 57 Mica. L. REv.
1244 (1959), 68 YALE L.J. 949 (1959).
1 This test derives from the so-called Standard Stations Case, Standard Oil Co. of
Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), which enjoined the enforcement of con-
tract clauses binding defendant's distributors to purchase all requirements of certain
goods from a given purchaser, on the ground that the clauses violated § 3 of the
Clayton Act. Section 3 provides that tying agreements and requirements contracts are
illegal when the effect of the particular arrangement ". . . may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Since this
language is virtually identical to that of § 7, it is reasonable to assume that any holding
applicable to the former will be applicable to the latter.
10 Cf. Standard Stations Case, supra note 16, in which only 6.7% of the taxable gal-lonage of gasoline sold in the relevant market was subject to the exclusive dealing
contracts.
-. Consider, for example, whether parties such as plaintiffs in the principal case
would have an action for damages if the FTC, through a preliminary injunction, had
restrained all control over the acquired corporation immediately after the cancellation
of plaintiffs' contracts.
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Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,"2
plaintiff brought a treble damage action alleging violations of section 7
of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act arising out
of defendant's corporate acquisition. The lower court, dealing pri-
marily with a statute of limitations problem, assumed the existence of
the right to damages for a section 7 violation. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, defendant not only raised the specific issue decided in
Bostitch,' but also referred to the Bostitch opinion:
The unanimity of these cases [Gottesman, Highland Supply, Bailey's
Bakery] is, however, somewhat counterbalanced by Anes v. Bastich
[sic]. . . That case, however, dearly errs in purporting to draw
authority from the decision below.21
The Supreme Court dealt with the limitations problem only, and did
not discuss Bostitch. Other Supreme Court decisions, however, express
a policy of effectuating antitrust statutes to the fullest extent permis-
sible by their language,22 implying concurrence with the result in the
principal case.
If treble damage claims are to be generally recognized for section 7
violations, potential liability for illegal corporate acquisition is signifi-
cantly increased, and a question is raised regarding the extent of the
class of potential plaintiffs. As in any judicial balancing of interests,
protection of injured parties should not be so covetous as to detri-
mentally curtail beneficial corporate acquisition.
Basically, two interpretations of standing to recover treble damages
under section 4 have evolved. There is some authority, mostly older
and all in lower courts, for what is sometimes called a "competitor"
theory, under which only a competitor of the antitrust violator can have
standing to recover treble damages.22 A second theory, termed the
19 381 U.S. 311 (1965), affirmng 332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964).
20 Brief for Petitioner-Defendant, pp. 75-76, Reply Brief for Petitioner-Defendant,
p. 18.
21 Reply Brief for Petitioner-Defendant, p. 18.
22 See text acompanying note 28, infra.
23 See, e.g., Rossi v. McCloskey & Co., 149 F. Supp. 638, 640 (E.D. Penn. 1957),
an action for damages by employees against their employer for his illegal antitrust
activities :
The plaintiffs are not competitors in the excavation business ... being monopolized,
and any injury they may have suffered from the asserted suppression of competition
was wholly incidental thereto. Injury which is merely a collateral effect of illegal
restraint upon competition is not compensable under the antitrust laws.
Compare Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.
1951), where the court said:
• . . [Plaintiff] must show that he is within that area of the economy which is
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.
Otherwise he is not injured "by reason" of anything forbidden in the anti-trust
laws.
[VoL. 41
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
"target" theory, is that anyone who is a target of illegal antitrust
activity can be injured; thus, anyone who is "aimed at" and "hit"
may recover, regardless of his competitive relationship to the antitrust
violator..24  Although recent decisions in the lower courts have favored
the target theory, the Supreme Court has intimated that even that test
is too restrictive for section 4. In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
A merican Crystal Sugar Co.,25 the Court allowed growers of beet sugar
to recover from their purchasers, rejecting the defense that plaintiff
was not a competitor:
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers,
or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts
because they are done by any of these. . . .The act is comprehensive
in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated .... 2r
Mandeville laid the foundation for the Court's analysis of section 4
in Radovich v. National Football League,27 in which a player was held
to have standing to recover for the anticompetitive activities of defend-
ant, which allegedly prevented plaintiff from obtaining a job within
See also Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F2d 383 (6th Cir.
1962) (supplier cannot recover from customer's competitor) ; Melrose Realty Co. v.
Loew's Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) (landlord
cannot recover from tenant's competitor) ; Productive Inventions Inc. v. Trico Prod-
ucts Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (patentee
cannot recover from licensee's competitor) ; Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d
959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (shareholder cannot recover from corporation's competitor).24 See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955),
allowing a manufacturer to recover from a producer:
.. [C]oncerning the "target area" . . . the rule is that ... the bystander who was
hit but not aimed at, cannot recover against the violator.
See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Calif. 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (semble) (con-
signee can recover from consignor) ; Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957) (player can recover from league) ; Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251 (1946) (by implication) (theater operator recovered from distributors) ;
Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (lessor) ; Roseland
v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942) (sales agent). See generally TIm-
BERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACONs § 4.03 (1963); BNA ANT-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP., B-I, B-4 (Dec. 17, 1963), which defined the target theory
as follows:
... [C]laimant's loss entitles him to treble damages only if he or his business
activity was one of the economic factors the antitrust violation was intended to
eliminate or counteract....
This statement may well be true only if the "intention" factor is taken with a broadened
connotation encompassing all direct and advertent consequences of the violation, since
the cited cases make it very doubtful that any element of malicious or predatory be-
havior is needed. Indeed, in Bostitch there is no indication that plantiffs' distributor-
ships were terminated for any reason other than anticipated efficiencies in distribution
growing out of vertical aspects of the acquisition.
25 334 U.S. 219 (1947). See Barnard & Zlinkoff, Patents, Procedure and the Sher-
man Act-The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEo. WAsn.
L. Rv. 1 (1948).
13 34 U.S. at 236 (dictum).
27352 U.S. 445 (1957), 57 COLum. L. Ry. 725 (1957), 71 HAsv. L. Rav. 170 (1957),
105 U. PA. L. RE. 110 (1956).
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the United States. Emphasizing the breadth of section 4, the Court
declared:
• . . Congress has . . . provided sanctions allowing private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect
the victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public. . . . In the
face of such a policy this Court should not add requirements to burden
the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in
those laws."'
It would be unfortunate if the Radovich policy gained general appli-
cation without some thought given to its effect upon the more putative
antitrust provisions, like section 7. Predication of treble damage
recovery on the "target" test of liability, while denying literal effect to
the provisions of section 4, does effectuate the theoretically cumulative
nature of private actions." If used in conjunction with the target test,
the result in Bostitch would not inordinately promote unlimited lia-
bility, stifle business expansion, or create windfalls for persons tan-
gentially suffering losses derivative from corporate acquisition. On the
other hand, liberal implementation of the Radovich policy might work
the opposite effect. Before allowing the courts to inaugurate such a
policy, Congress should reconsider such possibilities as (1) discretion-
ary trebling of damages,"0 (2) making compensatory damages more
freely available while restricting treble damages to consummated re-
straints, or (3) restricting treble damages to intentional injuries in the
case of unconsummated restraints.
UCC-LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF FINANCING
STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS
Filing requirements under the Connecticut enactment of the Uni-
form Commercial Code1 have been construed by two recent decisions
28 352 U.S. at 453-54.
29 The purposes of the private action for damages under § 4 are (1) compensation
for injuries caused by violators of the antitrust laws, (2) prevention of violations
through fear of cumulative damages, and (3) private assistance to the government in
enforcing these laws when proof is difficult for the government acting alone to obtain.
See ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955); MacIntyre, The Role
of the Private Litigant in Enforcement, 7 Antitrust Bull. 113 (1962) ; Comment,
Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Development in the Treble
Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061-2 (1952).3 0 Discretionary trebling of of damages was recommended by the Attorney General's
Committee, but the recommendation was not adopted by Congress. See ATTY'. GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955).
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1962 OFFIcIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS [hereinafter
cited as UCC].
Forty-three jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code: Ala. Acts
1965, act 549; ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.05.002-.794 (1962) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-1-101
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